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There has been much debate recently about the meaning, place and function of “character” and 
“character traits” in Virtue Ethics. For example, a number of philosophers have argued recently that 
Virtue Ethics would be strengthened as a theory by the omission of talk of character traits; recent 
neuroscientific studies have suggested that there is scope for scepticism about the existence of such 
traits. I will argue that both approaches are flawed and unconvincing: in brief, the first approach 
tends to be predicated on a narrow or insufficient conception of “character” and “character traits”; the 
second approach tends to go well beyond the available (empirical) evidence. Finally, I will argue that 
it is possible to point to a philosophy of education that is deeply informed by an understanding of 
virtue and ethics in which the concept of character has a coherent and meaningful role.  
Keywords: virtue ethics; character traits; neuroscience; compassion; eudaimonia. 
 
1 Introduction 
There has been much debate in ethics about the meaning and place of character traits in virtue 
ethics recently. Some like Robert Audi have argued that cognitive and motivational elements 
are of central importance; others such as Gilbert Harman and Christian B. Miller have argued 
that character traits are elusive and perhaps, illusory, things. Drawing on recent research in 
neuroscience on virtues (such as compassion), I will argue that the empirical evidence tends 
to support the former view, and that there are reasons to believe that virtues understood at 
cognitive and meta-cognitive, not just (conscious) motivational or deliberative levels, may 
run much more deeply in us that we have hitherto realised.  
There is relatively little work in philosophy (in the western tradition) on compassion, and 
especially on the relationship between compassion, virtue and character. But neuroscientists 
have recently show great interest in compassion (and virtue more broadly) and its neural 
correlates (see, for example, Corn, 2014; Condon, Desbordes, Miller  and DeSteno, 2013; 
Bernhardt and Singer, 2012; Brown, Brown and Penner, 2012; Cozolino, 2012; Della Sala and 
Anderson, 2012; Brockman, 2011; Porges, 2011; Goodman, 2009; Racine, 2010; and Rolls, 
2012; among many others).  
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It will be argued here that if compassion can be understood as a virtue, then compassion can 
be understood as a trait of character, and further, that recent research in neuroscience 
reinforces such a view. Moreover, in light of this research, virtues such as compassion can be 
thought of as robust in a sense that significantly extends our traditional conceptions of virtues 
as robust traits (or dispositions or habits); such research suggests that virtues may run “all 
the way down”, in us, so to speak (that is to say, run deeper than traits, habits, dispositions 
and/or activities as they are conventionally understood). 
2 On Compassion (and Eudaimonian Ethics) 
There has been much debate about compassion and the virtues recently, in neuroscience and 
in the philosophical literature. Nussbaum provides an illuminating account of compassion in 
relation to a lack of well-being.  
‘Compassion is an emotion directed at another person's suffering or lack of well-being. It 
requires the thought that the other person is in a bad way, and a pretty seriously bad way. 
(Thus we don't feel compassion for people's loss of trivial items like toothbrushes and paper 
clips.) It contains within itself an appraisal of the seriousness of various predicaments. Let 
us call this the judgment of seriousness.’ (2003, p.15). 
Compassion also entails an ‘appraisal’ and three kinds of judgment, not one: first of all it 
entails the ‘judgment of seriousness’, that is to say, the seriousness of the predicament in 
which the other finds themselves (‘in a seriously bad way’); second, she notes that the tradition 
neglects the  
‘judgment of similar possibilities: Aristotle, Rousseau, and others suggest that we have 
compassion only insofar as we believe that the suffering person shares vulnerabilities and 
possibilities with us. I think we can clearly see that this judgment is not strictly necessary 
for the emotion, as the other two seem to be. We have compassion for nonhuman animals, 
without basing it on any imagined similarity - although, of course, we need somehow to 
make sense of their predicament as serious and bad’ ((2003, p.15). 
The point is well made. The ‘vulnerabilities and possibilities’ do not in any obvious way have 
to be those we share; we can feel compassion for total strangers; we can have compassion in 
theory for creatures who have little or nothing in common with us, for compassion, 
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fundamentally, is a response to evident suffering and pain, not necessarily to our experience 
of suffering and pain mediated through some consideration of common or shared 
characteristics or attributes – one only has to consider the fact that we are often not in a 
strong epistemic position, for example, to make a determination about the things that the 
suffering other has in common with us; nor are we always in a strong position to accurately 
guage shared vulnerabilities and, especially, shared possibilities. We can have compassion for 
a non-human, no-animal and, in theory, we can make some sense of their predicament even if 
they strike us as radically other. Indeed we may want to help them because they are so 
different! There is necessary logical or ethical contradiction here. 
Finally, Nussbaum argues that there is room for something which is often omitted, but which 
is required to “make the account complete”,  
‘the eudaimonistic judgment, namely, a judgment that places the suffering person or persons 
among the important parts of the life of the person who feels the emotion. In my more 
general analysis of emotions, I argue that they are always eudaimonistic, meaning focused 
on the agent's most important goals and projections’ (2003, p.12). 
It is arguable that this provides a complete account however. Notwithstanding the fact these 
may be required, there is room for others. Compassion may also ‘contain’ within itself a 
judgement of what is right for these suffering beings and a judgment of what outcomes would be 
appropriate without denying them their dignity, their autonomy, their rationality and without 
compromising their integrity and its associated emotions. Compassion may also “contain” 
within itself a desire, a will and an impetus, for example, towards some eudaimonian end. 
Nussbaum then links this virtue to the tragedy of September 11: 
‘Indeed, the events of September 11 make vivid a philosophical problem that has been 
debated from the time of Euripides through much of the history of the Western 
philosophical tradition. 
This is the question of what to do about compassion, given its obvious importance in 
shaping the civic imagination, but given, too, its obvious propensity for self-serving 
narrowness. Is compassion, with all its limits, our best hope as we try to educate citizens to 
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think well about human relations both inside the nation and across national boundaries?’ 
(2003, p.12). 
But what is it about compassion that gives it ‘its obvious importance in shaping the civic 
imagination’ (if we grant for the purposes of argument that it does indeed have this 
importance)? Its ‘obvious propensity for self-serving narrowness’, it has to be said, need not 
be so obvious, or so evident, and the proposition has not really been demonstrated in 
Nussbaum’s essay (the examples are hardly sufficient to do this) - though it should be said 
that compassion, if it is a virtue, is open to excess and deficiency like other virtues, and as 
such, may be expressed in a form that is self-servingly narrow. However, it is hard to see how 
it would count as a virtue at all once that kind of compassion is actualised. Certainly 
compassion is or ought to have limits- that point is not in dispute. What is in dispute is the 
proposition that compassion as a virtue, especially when related to the Cardinal Virtues, like 
justice and phronesis, has an ‘obvious propensity for self-serving narrowness’.  
Compassion may be part of our best hope; it is doubtful that it can be our best hope, simply 
because our best hope arguably needs to integrate many things: connections, desires, fellow-
feelings, mindfulness, emotion, concepts, judgments, plans, virtues certainly, strategies, co-
operation, clear objectives, among many other things, but also without forgetting 
eudaimonian deliberation, ends and goals, especially if educating citizens ‘to think well about 
human relations both inside the nation and across national boundaries’ is the focus. 
Nussbaum argues convincingly that  
‘the enemies of compassion hold that we cannot build a stable and lasting concern for 
humanity on  the basis of such a slippery and uneven motive; impartial motives based on 
ideas of dignity and respect should take its place. The friends of compassion reply that 
without building political morality on what we know and on what has deep roots in our 
child hood attachments, we will be left with a morality that is empty of urgency – a 
'watery' concern, as Aristotle put it.’ (2003, p.12). 
Certainly her argument against the claim that ‘we cannot build a stable and lasting concern 
for humanity on the basis of such a slippery and uneven motive’ is a strong one, for there are 
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no compelling reasons either in the scientific literature or in the philosophical debates, to 
believe that compassion is predominantly, or even fundamentally or primarily, ‘a slippery and 
uneven motive. Her argument is strong also because the question of another agent’s motive is 
not always clear or straightforward, or easy to read, so to speak, either in ethical, 
epistemological or metaphysical contexts - and certainly not as clear or as straightforward as 
the position which she is attacking implies or suggests. She adds, with a focus on the ‘thoughts 
and imaginings on which it [compassion] is based’, that it will give us a clearer perspective on 
how and where it is likely to go wrong, and a good basis upon which to examine  
‘the counter-tradition's proposal that we can base political morality on respect for dignity, 
doing away with appeals to compassion. This proposal, at first attractive, contains, on 
closer inspection, some deep difficulties.’ (2003, p.14).  
Certainly her analysis is lucid and her argument against the view that we in some sense need 
to base ‘political morality on respect for dignity’ thus necessarily ‘doing away with appeals to 
compassion’, is a persuasive one. In defence of her argument against the ‘counter-tradition's 
proposal’, one could argue that, at the very least, there is no logical contradiction in affirming 
on the one hand, that we can ‘base political morality on respect for dignity’ and maintaining, 
on the other hand, a meaningful part for an appeal to compassion. (Just what such a part would 
look like is beyond the immediate scope of this article, though ripe for analysis and 
development in a further article). The reason for this is quite clear: a respect for dignity, in 
relation to political morality, in the sense that it entails some awareness or acknowledgment, 
of worthiness, desert, merit or moral worth, poses no necessary contradiction or logical 
inconsistency, when coupled with a sense of another’s desert or merit or moral worth - indeed, 
this is what a sense of compassion may highlight well and truly, that is, a sense of another’s 
desert or merit or moral worth. Moreover, in an empirical sense, it is hard to see how basing 
‘political morality on respect for dignity’ is sufficient to exclude any kind of (meaningful or 
legitimate) appeal to compassion. 
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Finally, Nussbaum adds that the task of teaching compassion requires asking some hard 
questions: 
‘So to begin the task of educating compassion as best we can, we need to ask how and why 
local loyalties and attachments come to take in some instances an especially virulent and 
aggressive form, militating against a more general sympathy. To answer this question we 
need a level of psychological understanding that was not available in the ancient Greek and 
Roman world, or not completely. I would suggest… that one problem we particularly need 
to watch out for is a type of pathological narcissism in which the person demands complete 
control over all the sources of good, and a complete self-sufficiency…’ (2003, p.24). 
This is strong stuff and it needs to be said. ‘Local loyalties and attachments’ in their ‘virulent 
and aggressive form’, one might argue, require ethical deliberation, analysis and evaluation, 
especially in relation to virtues like courage, temperance, justice, practical wisdom and 
honesty, and especially in relation to ends like flourishing, broadly conceived. If ‘pathological 
narcissism’ is the operative mode, then virtue ethics, with its philosophical roots in the 
analysis of character, dispositions, (virtuous) habits, means and avoidance of (moral) excesses 
and deficiencies, might just play an important analytic and therapeutic role, so to speak, 
especially since the origins of such forms of narcissism may highlight questions of character 
and habits which may or may not be deliberative. The fact that it is pathological serves only 
to suggest that virtue ethics play an important role again, since what is suggested is that the 
condition is excessive and at least potentially vicious. 
3 The Question of Character (Neuroscience, Compassion and Virtue) 
There have been some notable critics of the role of character in ethics recently and numerous 
neuroscientific studies have contributed much to our understanding of compassion as a virtue 
(and its roots in one’s character). For example, Yoni K. Ashar, Jessica R. Andrews-Hanna, 
Sona Dimidjian and Tor D. Wager argue that compassion is ‘comprised of multiple 
component processes, including the generation of affective feelings, inferences about others’ 
mental states, and appraisal of the meaning of another’s suffering in relation to oneself. These 
component processes are supported by distinct brain systems, which represent content—
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specific feelings, judgments, and meaning representations—in the form of unique spatio-
temporal patterns of neural activity.’ (2012, p.2). 
Helen Y. Weng, Andrew S. Fox, Alexander J. Shackman, Diane E. Stodola, Jessica Z. K. 
Caldwell, Matthew C. Olson, Gregory M. Rogers and Richard J. Davidson found that  
‘compassion training increased altruistic redistribution of funds to a victim encountered 
outside of the training context. Furthermore, increased altruistic behavior after 
compassion training was associated with altered activation in brain regions implicated in 
social cognition and emotion regulation, including the inferior parietal cortex and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and in DLPFC connectivity with the nucleus 
accumbens. These results suggest that compassion can be cultivated with training and that 
greater altruistic behavior may emerge from increased engagement of neural systems 
implicated in understanding the suffering of other people, executive and emotional control, 
and reward processing.’ (2013, p.1171). 
Weng’s team concludes first, that with virtues such as compassion, not only do the roots of 
compassionate behaviour run deep cognitively or psychologically, so to speak, they run as 
deep, at least, as the level of neurons and neural circuits and neural activity in our brains and 
nervous systems; second; that virtues such as compassion can be cultivated with training or 
teaching; third, that increased virtuous or altruistic behaviour ‘may emerge from increased 
engagement of neural systems implicated in understanding the suffering of other people, 
executive and emotional control, and reward processing’ (2013, p.1170). They also  
‘hypothesized that greater altruism resulting from compassion training would be predicted 
by training-related changes in the neural responses to images of suffering. .. [tests 
showed] training-induced changes in right IPC activation were differentially associated 
with altruistic redistribution in the two training groups... In compassion trainees, greater 
IPC activation due to training was associated with greater redistribution…’ (2013, p.1176). 
In other words, the brains of those who had been taught compassion techniques (that is, 
techniques that instantiate compassion as a virtue, that is, as a disposition to fellow-feel, to 
distinguish between self and other, to relate with pity or sorrow to others who are being 
treated unjustly, and intervene to help them on this very basis) showed marked changes in 
neural activity (for example, ‘increased engagement of neural systems implicated in 
understanding the suffering of other people, executive and emotional control, and reward 
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processing’ (p.1170) ; these changes were apparent in neural responses for example when 
these subjects were shown images of suffering;  the levels of neural activation were observably 
greater in subjects who had been taught compassion techniques; further, training related 
changes in neural patterns of response to suffering could help to predict increased levels of 
activity geared towards helping others (for example, by giving away money in order to 
address cases in which an unjust  
It is quite conceivable (if the study discussed above is sound) that virtues, or at any rate, 
some virtues, are more deeply rooted in us than we believe; and if they run this deep, so to 
speak, that is, to the extent that our neural structures and mechanisms are involved or 
implicated in increased behaviour which is in accord with such virtues, after ‘training’, then it 
is also possible to argue that desirable traits (such as those that instantiate compassion), in so 
far as they are virtuous, can be strengthened in us  not just at the level of disposition, 
reflection, activity and practise, but at a more fundamental level which is itself characterised 
by plasticity – that is to say, dynamic, modifiable, and measurable or observable, in a sense, 
and as a corollary, describable, at least in terms of neural activation and significant 
correlations. 
However, the further conclusion drawn by Weng et al., is not conclusive: for example, they 
claim that these ‘findings support the possibility that compassion and altruism can be viewed 
as trainable skills rather than as stable traits’ [emphasis added]. This lays the groundwork for 
future research to explore whether compassion-related trainings can benefit fields that 
depend on altruism and cooperation (e.g., medicine) as well as clinical subgroups (Hofmann, 
Grossman, & Hinton, 2011) characterized by deficits in compassion, such as psychopaths 
(Blair, 2007).’ But ‘the possibility that compassion and altruism can be viewed as trainable 
skills’ does not necessarily rule out the possibility that compassion, and other such virtues, 
can be viewed as robust or ‘stable traits’ or habits. The two are not necessarily exclusive. 
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Moreover, the study, strictly speaking, does not demonstrate the distinction that is being 
made by the researchers. 
There are strong reasons to reject a number of objections to the existence or meaningfulness 
of character traits, their place and/or function in virtue ethics. Some might object and argue 
that what such neuroscientific studies show is not the existence of a ‘trait’ but a correlation 
only – ‘trait’ in the sense that Gilbert Harman sets out: ‘robust habits of perception, 
motivation and action’ (Harman,1999, p.1 ) and further that the existence of such correlations 
does not show that ‘virtue’ is learned.  
This argument however is not convincing: first of all, a character ‘trait’ (like compassion) is 
not merely a robust habit of perception, motivation and action. Such definitions do not capture the 
complexity here sufficiently: if a person is compassionate (genuinely) and acts accordingly 
(genuinely), the analysis needs to go well beyond talk of ‘habits’ in this sense, as neuroscience 
has shown us -  for example, with a ‘trait’ like compassion, there are also robust neural activity 
and levels of neural activation, deep levels of processing, involved in the instantiation of the 
‘trait’ and conceivably, in the existence of the ‘trait’ itself; just as there are robust neural 
networks as well as robust ways of thinking, discrimination and deliberation (evident for 
example in the considered and one would hope, accurate, differentiation of self and suffering 
other, just and unjust situations). 
Second, there is a correlation, but it is a correlation between increased levels of activation in 
neural circuits, associated with cognitive and emotion regulation, for example, and changes 
brought about by training in compassion techniques, that is to say, robust changes (which 
means: marked, strong and/or potentially and actually enduring changes - at the 
neurophysiological level - at the very least, that allow some successful predictions to take 




Harman also argues 
‘Some versions of virtue ethics connect virtues with human flourishing. In one version, a 
virtue is a character trait that contributes to the flourishing of the agent. In another 
version, the virtues are character traits that contribute to the flourishing of people in 
general. In either version… it is not easy to provide a noncircular account of human 
flourishing that leaves the resulting view sounding plausible.’ (1999, p.168). 
However, Harman does not capture sufficiently here the complexity of the term ‘virtues’ and 
as a consequence, his argument cannot do the work that he wants it to do. It is at best 
incomplete. For example, Aristotle understood virtues in terms of means, dispositions and 
robust habits or characteristics; Annas understands them as persistent features of one’s 
character and as a deep feature of a person with affective and intellectual aspects (2011, p.8); 
Hursthouse understands virtues in terms of emotions and emotional reactions, ‘choices, 
values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities’ (in short, a 
‘complex mindset’) (2012, n.p.); there are many other accounts. Unless one considers virtues 
in the light of such complexity, in relation to flourishing, it is difficult to see how Harman’s 
claim, namely that the connections between virtues and flourishing are circular, can be 
defended in any conclusive way.  
Moreover, Miller argues: 
‘(B*) On the basis of observing helping behavior, most people infer (whether consciously or 
not) that certain individuals—perhaps family members, friends, community leaders, 
politicians, or the like—are compassionate people. 
To this it adds the metaphysical claim that: 
(M*) Few people actually have the virtue of compassion, and what instead plays a 
significant role with respect to most helping is often a Mixed Helping Trait. 
Thus it follows that: 
(C*) Most of our actual moral judgments involving the ascription of compassion to one or 
more individuals turn out to be false. 
Less formally, think about the people in your life whom you think are compassionate. 
Perhaps they include some of your friends, or a leader in the community. If the argument for 
(C*) is correct, then it is likely that these people do not really have the virtue of compassion, 
but instead a Mixed Helping Trait. So while you might think you know their character well, 
many of your beliefs in this area actually turn out to be mistaken.’ (2014, p.8). 
 
This argument is problematic; it is difficult to progress beyond the very first step in the 
argument. This first claim is that, on the basis of observing helping behaviour, most people 
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infer (whether consciously or not) that certain individuals—perhaps family members, friends, 
community leaders, politicians, or the like—are compassionate people. First, there is an 
epistemic question: Miller does not explain how one can know what ‘most people’ infer 
unconsciously, or subconsciously (if one assumes that such things are possible), and how this 
happens from mere observations of ‘helping behaviour’. Without such a bridging account, it 
is difficult to accept this (unsubstantiated) premise. Second there is a logical question: his 
understanding of inference is questionable. For example, it is not clear what subconscious or 
unconscious inferences look like, so to speak, for in conventional usage an ‘inference’ involves 
a conscious process of reasoning and logical argumentation. It is of course possible that 
processes of reasoning and logical argumentation may take place at a subconscious or 
unconscious level, but the onus is on Miller to show that this is the case. He does not do this. 
Third, there is sceptical question: he does not provide any conclusive grounds for believing 
that the claim that family members or friends are compassionate, in reality, is generally or 
fundamentally doubtful. (Basing these assertions on studies with very limited samples, that is 
limited in number and limited in scope, adds to the doubt that arises here.) 
The second claim is hardly more secure, especially given its “metaphysical” nature:  
‘(M*) few people actually have the virtue of compassion, and what instead plays a significant 
role with respect to most helping is often a Mixed Helping Trait.’ (2014, p.8). 
Miller seems to miss something fundamentally important in the structure of the argument 
here. This claim is not just a metaphysical claim; it is an unsubstantiated, unjustified, 
metaphysical claim. If some people have the virtue of compassion, in fact, then most people 
need not necessarily infer wrongly - regardless of whether the inference is conscious, 
subconscious or unconscious – ‘that certain individuals (perhaps family members, friends, 
community leaders, politicians, or the like) are compassionate people.’ Second, the role that a 
Mixed Helping Trait plays is rather unclear: what sort of a role does it play and what sort of 
significance applies here? It could play a very minor role and that role could still be 
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significant, conceivably; it could play a secondary role and that role could still be significant, 
conceivably. It is difficult to say which Miller has in mind at times in the argument. In any 
case, if traits do exist, as a Mixed Helping Trait apparently does exist, then how it is difficult 
to see how one can rule out categorically, on the basis of the evidence provided above and 
discussed in the book, other traits like compassion. Much work remains to be done in these 
areas of inquiry. 
The conclusion Miller draws from this series of questionable and/or problematic premises 
is:   
‘(C*) most of our actual moral judgments involving the ascription of compassion to one or 
more individuals turn out to be false. 
Less formally, think about the people in your life whom you think are compassionate. 
Perhaps they include some of your friends, or a leader in the community. If the argument for 
(C*) is correct, then it is likely that these people do not really have the virtue of compassion, 
but instead a Mixed Helping Trait. So while you might think you know their character well, 
many of your beliefs in this area actually turn out to be mistaken.’ (2014, p.8). 
 
The conclusion though does not seem to follow. Miller’s reliance on (weak) inductive 
generalisations is quite problematic: for example, he has not produced strong evidence that 
sheds light on what ‘most of us’ (leaving to one side the question of what this phrase might 
mean) ascribe to others when we make ‘actual moral judgments’ concerning compassion; nor 
does he produce compelling evidence that sheds light on why most, and not merely some, 
ascriptions of compassion ‘to one or more individuals’ should turn out to be false. It must be 
said that there is no compelling reason to assume that the evidence from the available studies 
can and should be generalised or extrapolated in order to apply to most beings who are 
capable of making such ascriptions.   
If we do think – ‘most’ of us (leaving aside the significant degree of vagueness here) - about 
the people in our lives whom we think are compassionate, and include, perhaps, some friends, 
or a ‘leader in the community’, then the flaws in the argument would suggest that it is likely 
that Miller’s claim that ‘these people do not really have the virtue of compassion’ seems 
doubtful at best, and underdetermined at worst. The final part of his conclusion is doubly 
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flawed:  while he might assert that we only think (mistakenly) that we know their character 
well, and that many of our beliefs ‘in this area actually turn out to be mistaken’, he nonetheless 
does not produce sufficient evidence to show that the argument he is presenting is conclusive, 
just as he does not show that the position he is affirming is one that is clearly and 
demonstrably true. 
If all of this is sound, then the following argument becomes possible. If compassion is a 
virtue, and virtues are traits, then compassion training is virtue training and traits can be 
taught; if compassion training is virtue training, and if compassion training promotes 
compassionate activity (or better, compassionate intervention), if it allows neuroscientists to 
produce accurate predictions about the likelihood of compassionate activity or intervention 
(which can be tested neuro-scientifically) and  allows us to predict accurately neuro-physical 
changes and increased activation in known neural circuits associated with the regulation, for 
example, of emotions or states such as compassion, as well as the expression of compassionate 
activity or intervention, then it follows that increased activation in these known neural 
circuits correlates with increased activity (either mental or physical) which may be described 
as virtuous. Further, if compassion is a virtue and compassion can be taught effectively, then 
virtue can be taught effectively (in one sense, at least).  
Robert Audi argues that that virtues do ‘vary along many dimensions… [and] may be more 
or less deeply rooted’ (2012, pp. 273-274). It is possible to go further: if compassion is a virtue 
and if compassion has deep connections in us, for example, at the level of neural circuits, 
structures and systems, then virtues, in at least one sense, are more ‘deeply rooted’ than we 









Annas, Julia, (2011) Intelligent Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
__________  (2011) Law and Virtue in Plato. In Christopher Bobonich, Editor, Essays on 
Plato's Laws (pp. 71-91). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
__________ (2008) Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism. In Paul Bloomfield, Editor, 
Morality and Self-Interest (pp.205-221). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
__________, (2000) Voices of Ancient Philosophy: a collection of introductory readings. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Aristotle, (1976 ) The Ethics of Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics , translated  J A K 
Thomson, London: Penguin. 
Audi , Robert (1997) Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press,  
_________ (1989) Practical Reasoning. London and New York: Routledge. 
_________ (2011) Faith, Faithfulness, and Virtue, Faith and Philosophy, 28, 3, 294-311. 
_________ (2011) Virtue Ethics as a Resource in Business, Business Ethics Quarterly, 22, 2, 
373-391. 
_________ (2010) Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, lxxxiv, 79-97. 
_________ (2009) Moral Virtue and Reasons for Action, Philosophical Issues (Nous 
supplementary volume), 19, 1-20. 
Baril, Anne (2014). Eudaimonia in Contemporary Virtue Ethics. In Stan van Hooft (Editor), 
The Handbook of Virtue Ethics (pp.17-27). London: Acumen.  
Buckle, Stephen (2002). Aristotle's Republic or, Why Aristotle's Ethics is Not Virtue Ethics. 
Philosophy 77, 4, pp.565-595. 
Campbel,l Keith (1985). Self-Mastery and Stoic Ethics. Philosophy 60, 233, pp.327-340. 
Carr, David Jan and Steutel, Willem (1999). Virtue Ethics and Moral Education. London: 
Routledge. 
Chappell, T. D. J. (Editor) (2006). Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary 
Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Decety, J. (2007). A social cognitive neuroscience model of human empathy. In E. Harmon-
Jones & P. Winkielman (Eds.) Social Neuroscience: Integrating biological and psychological 
explanations of social behavior (pp. 246-270). New York: Guilford.                                                                    
Fröding, Barbro (2010). Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life. 
Neuroethics 4, 3, pp. 1-12. 
Gross, J.J., Thompson, R.A. (2007). Emotion regulation: Conceptual foundations. In J.J. 
Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 3-24). New York: Guilford. Nielsen, L., & 
16 
 
Kaszniak, A.W. (2006). Awareness of subtle emotional feelings: A comparison of long-term 
meditators and non-meditators. Emotion, 6, 392-405.                                                                                    
Harman, Gilbert (1999). Virtue Ethics without Character Traits.  
https://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/Thomson.html (accessed October 14 2015) 
Heinaman, R. (2007). Eudaimonia as an Activity in Nicomachean Ethics I. 8-12. Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 33, pp.247-279. 
Hursthouse, R., Virtue Ethics, 2012, 
http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/archives/sum2012/entries/ethics-virtue/ (Accessed 
October 14, 2015) 
__________ (2006) Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Ethical Theory? In James 
Dreier (Editor). Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (pp. 99–112). Oxford: Blackwell. 
__________ (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
__________ (1999). Virtue Ethics and Human Nature. Hume Studies 25, 1/2), pp. 67-82. 
King, John A., Blair, James R., Mitchell, Derek G.V., Dolan, Raymond J. and Burgess, Neil. 
(2006). Doing the right thing: A common neural circuit for appropriate violent or 
compassionate behaviour. Neuroimage, April, 15, 30, 3,1069-1076.  
http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Derek_Mitchell2/publication/7460827_Doing_the_r
ight_thing_a_common_neural_circuit_for_appropriate_violent_or_compassionate_behavior
/links/09e4150a3bc8bdb5d5000000.pdf (accessed October 14 2015) 
Kupperman, Joel J. (2001). The Indispensability of Character. Philosophy 76, 2, pp.239-250. 
_______________ (2009). Virtue in Virtue Ethics. Journal of Ethics, 13, 2-3, pp. 243 - 255. 
LeBar, Mark (2009). Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints. Ethics 119, 4, pp. 642-671. 
McIntyre, Alasdair (1968). A Short History of Ethics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
_______________ (1990). Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry. Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame. 
_______________ (1981). After Virtue. Indiana: University of Notre Dame. 
Menchola, M., Kaszniak, A.W., & Burton, K.W. (2008). Interaction between habitual and 
voluntary emotion regulation and the chronometry of affective responses. Poster presented 
at the annual meeting of the Society for Psychophysiological Research. 
http://www.investigatinghealthyminds.org/ScientificPublications/2013/WengCompassion
AssociationForPsychologicalScience.pdf  (Accessed October 1 2015). 
Miller, Christian (2014). Character and Moral Psychology Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
_____________  (2014). The Real Challenge to Virtue Ethics From Psychology. In Snow 
Nancy & Trivigno Franco (Editors) (pp.15-34). The Philosophy and Psychology of Virtue: 
An Empirical Approach to Character and Happiness. London: Routledge. 
Mintoff, Joe (2009). In Defense of the Ideal of a Life Plan. Southern Journal of Philosophy 
47, 2, pp.159-186. 
17 
 
Nussbaum. Martha (2003). Compassion & Terror. Daedalus, 132, 1 (Winter, 2003), pp. 10-
26. 
_______________ (2001). The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
_______________ (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
_______________ (2002) Humanities and Human Development, Journal of Aesthetic 
Education, 36, 3 (Autumn, 2002, pp. 39-49. 
_______________ (1994). Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literature and the Law. 
Harvard Law Review, 107, 3, January 1994, pp. 714-744. 
_______________ (with Rosalind Hursthouse) (1984). Plato on Commensurability and 
Desire. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 58 pp. 55-96. 
Poulin, M. J., Brown, S. L., Dillard, A. J., & Smith, D. M. (2013). Giving to others and the 
association between stress and mortality. American Journal of Public Health. e-View Ahead 
of Print. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2012.300876 
Rand, D. G., Greene, G. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2013). Spontaneous giving and calculated 
greed. Nature, 489, 227–430. 
Russell, Daniel C. (2013). The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Vianello, M., Galliani, E. M., & Haidt, J. (2010). Elevation at work: The organizational 
effects of leaders’ moral excellence. Journal of Positive Psychology, 5, 390–411. 
Warneken, F. & Tomasello, M. (2006). Altruistic helping in human infants and young 
chimpanzees. Science, 311, 1301–1003. 
Weng, Helen Y., Fox, Andrew S., Shackman, Alexander J., Stodola, Diane E., K. Caldwell, 
Jessica Z., Olson, Matthew C., Rogers Gregory M. and Davidson, Richard J. (2013) 
Compassion Training Alters Altruism and Neural Responses to Suffering. Psychological 
Science 24, 7, 1171–1180.  
Younis Raymond Aaron (2009). On the Ethical Life. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars. 
___________________ (2014) The Eudaimonian Question: Virtue, Ethics, Neuroscience 
and Higher Education. In PESA Conference Papers 2014 (pp. 80-92) ISBN Number: ISBN 
978--‐0--‐473--‐29684--‐1            
